Thomas De Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, gave exclusive interview to Eurasia Diary concerning foreign policy of Trump administration in South Caucasus and Eastern Europe.
De Waal has worked extensively as a journalist and writer in the Caucasus and Black Sea region and in Russia. He has also worked for the BBC and for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, a London-based NGO.
Eurasia Diary: How can you predict foreign policy of the Trump administration in South Caucasus and Eastern Europe?
Thomas De Waal: Nothing can be predicted about the foreign policy of the Trump administration. Trump himself is extremely ignorant of foreign policy. We know that he favors a new and more friendly relationship with President Vladimir Putin, but we have heard very little about what could be the basis for that rapprochement--greater cooperation on fighting IS in Syria is not enough. Many people are expecting a lower level of engagement by the United States in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe, but dis-engagement would be a slow process. The United States is engaged diplomatically, politically and financially in every country of the region and that will not stop overnight.
Eurasia Diary: From point of your view, what is different political position carried out by Republicans and Democrats that is related to South Caucasian and Eastern European affairs?
Thomas De Waal: In 2008, Republican presidential candidate John McCain accused his Democratic rival Barack Obama of being too soft on Russia. Fears were voiced that the new administration would “abandon” Georgia or Ukraine. That did not happen, of course. Now, ironically, we have the opposite picture, in which the new Republican president is perceived as being too close to Russia. So it is not a matter of Republicans and Democrats, but of both parties being different from President Trump.
Eurasia Diary: From your opinion, how should leaders of two powerful states cooperate in resolution of ethnic and territorial conflicts in South Caucasus, as well as in Ukraine?
Thomas De Waal: Every conflict is different. Russia is a direct participant in most of the conflicts of the post-Soviet space, from Moldova to Georgia to Ukraine. Russia cannot resolve these conflicts unless it makes itself neutral by withdrawing militarily from these regions—and it will not do so. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia’s role is different as it seeks a good relationship with both Baku and Yerevan. As Russia’s influence here is more limited, it therefore seeks greater cooperation with Europe (France in the case of the OSCE Minsk Group) and the United States. Here cooperation can certainly continue—but the key decisions on the Karabakh conflict will continue to be made in Baku and Yerevan.
Eurasia Diary: What will governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan expect from the Trump administration in the settlement of Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
Thomas De Waal: They will expect very little, as he has no knowledge of this conflict. The hope will be that Secretary of State Tillerson, who has knowledge of the region because of his years in the oil business, will put this conflict high on his agenda.
Eurasia Diary: Georgia is only strong partner of the USA in South Caucasus. What will Georgians expect from foreign policy of Trump administration?
Thomas De Waal: Georgians are nervous. They bet heavily on a Hillary Clinton victory in November—as did Ukrainians. Their hope is that, having visited Georgia in order to discuss a Trump Tower project, Trump will look favorably on their country.
Eurasia Diary: Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has signed a decree allowing troops from the United States and other NATO countries to carry out training missions in Ukraine during 2017. Do you regard that it will invigorate Russia more to intervene in Eastern Ukraine militarily and politically?
Thomas De Waal: Russia will use even the smallest involvement of NATO in neighbor countries as an excuse to increase its aggressive rhetoric. The extent of Russia’s military involvement in eastern Ukraine is decided at the highest levels and with the intention of putting pressure on President Poroshenko in Kiev and the Western critics of Russia. But Moscow has to be careful—a too-open intervention will strengthen the argument for sanctions to remain in place.
By Yunis Abdullayev
Edited by Taleh Guliyev
