The chief surprise that emerged from the U.S.-North Korea summit was President Trump’s announcement to suspend U.S.-South Korean military exercises. In the post-summit press conference, Trump noted: “We will stop the war games, which will save us a tremendous amount of money. Unless and until we see the future negotiations is not going along like it should. ... Plus, it is very provocative.” Exercises likely would have been on the table at some point, assuming the North remained committed to denuclearization, but this decision came far earlier in the process than expected.
The United States and South Korea conduct three major exercises each year, among other smaller ones. In the fall, the allies hold an exercise called Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG), named after a 7th century Korean military leader. UFG is a command post exercise that is largely a computer simulation lasting approximately two weeks; it helps planners coordinate intelligence, logistics and joint air operations.
In spring, the allies conduct another two-week command post exercise, Key Resolve, and an eight-week joint field training exercise named Foal Eagle that practices force-on-force operations and the flow of U.S. forces to Korea should war break out. At times the exercises have included the use of strategic assets such as B-52 bombers that can carry nuclear weapons.
Military exercises are a central part of the alliance. The U.S. defense commitment includes 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea, along with the ability and willingness to flow forces to the peninsula if there is an attack. To maintain proficiency, military forces must practice, and this includes not only U.S. troops but also U.S. and South Korean militaries working together.
Moreover, most U.S. military personnel are deployed to South Korea for one- or two-year tours with ground combat forces on a nine- to 12-month rotation cycle. To ensure these forces are ready requires regular training and exercises. The exercises also provide an important measure of assurance to allies and a deterrence message to adversaries.
What impact would an exercise pause have on alliance readiness? Washington and Seoul have stopped exercises on a few occasions, including in 1992 and from 1994 to 1996, coinciding with the Clinton-era denuclearization deal called the Agreed Framework. In talking with several U.S. Army officers, if exercises were suspended again, U.S. and South Korean troops would continue to train but at a smaller scale, maintaining a reasonable degree of readiness at the unit level.
The bigger question is the impact on strategic-level operations to bring U.S. forces to the peninsula in the event of a major North Korean incursion. However, some of this can be practiced in the short term as a smaller command post exercise that would be less objectionable to Pyongyang. This tempo could be sustained for maybe a year, but to do so for an extended period of time would begin to have a serious impact on alliance readiness.
It may be worth the risk to suspend exercises for a year if both allies agree. The likelihood of North Korea launching a major operation across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is remote, and if suspending the exercises can set the stage for denuclearization, it is worth the risk. After a year, it likely will be clear whether Pyongyang is sincere regarding its intention to denuclearize.
Republic of Korea and United States forces will maintain sufficient readiness through other sorts of joint training. At the very least, exercises should be scaled back to refrain from incorporating strategic assets such as B-52 bombers or public proclamations of exercising decapitation plans. Confidence-building measures are important and appropriate if the denuclearization process moves forward.
However, the most troubling element of President Trump’s offer was that it was not coordinated with South Korea. A statement from the office of South Korean President Moon Jae-in after the summit indicated, “At this moment, we need to figure out President Trump’s accurate meaning and intention” — a sign that Seoul was blindsided by the announcement. A decision to suspend exercises is an alliance decision and not one that should be done unilaterally.
Regardless of one’s view of the wisdom of suspending exercises, doing so without consulting Seoul is a terrible way to work with allies. This is even more concerning regarding President Trump’s offhand comment about wanting to remove U.S. troops from South Korea.
A short-term pause in the military exercises can be a positive gesture to maintain the momentum for negotiations and test North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize. U.S. and ROK forces can still train in ways that won’t drastically hurt readiness and, after a year, the exercises easily could be switched back on if the denuclearization process has broken down. Though much needs to occur to show North Korea is truly committed to denuclearization, suspending exercises temporarily is an option that can be explored without risking South Korean security.
